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“La personalità nazionale (come la personalità individuale) è una mera 
astrazione se considerata fuori dal nesso internazionale (o sociale). La 
personalità nazionale esprime un ‘distinto’ del complesso internazionale, 
pertanto è legata ai rapporti internazionali”  




While in the United States and in Great Britain post-1945 policies 
can be described as a basic shift from anti-Fascism to Anti-
Communism, destined to influence the transnational climate of the 
Western world, in countries like Italy and France such shift 
determined a split between irreconcilable tendencies. Italy was the 
most extreme case. In the aftermath of World War Two, the image 
and perception of Communism in Italian society were much more 
divided and polarised than in Western European countries - major 
factors being the legacy of Fascist Anti-Communism, the influence of 
the Catholic Church, the impact of Anti-Fascist resistance and of the 
civil war that took place in 1943-45. The ambivalence between Anti-
Fascism and Anti-Communism soon became central to the Italian 
Republic. On one side, the legacy of Anti-Fascism was reflected in 
the Constitution, thus providing legitimacy for the Communists as a 
component of the Republican political space. On the other side, the 
emergence of Anti-Communism de-legitimized Communists as a 
force enabled to rule the country. In the political realm such a 
conflict was mitigated even during the most acute moments of the 
early Cold War thanks to the wise conduct of the main leaders on 
both sides. But a twofold legitimacy – the constitutional one based 
on Anti-Fascism and the political one based on Anti-Communism - 
put nonetheless deep roots in political cultures and in the socio-
cultural sub-systems. Contrary to all other Western European 
countries, including France, in the long post-war era Italian political 
culture was recurrently focused on the polarization between 
Communists and Anti-Communists. This may appear as a paradox. 
In fact, in the political discourse on both sides, Cold War loyalties 
were often questioned, albeit with shifting emphasis. This happened, 
in particular, in the 1970s. Nevertheless, even when traditional Cold 
War culture was losing its grasp, the legacy of international loyalties 
and identities exerted its visible, if residual influence. The opposition 
between Communism and Anti-Communism was preserved in Italian 
political culture, in spite of its obsolescence.  
In my paper, I intend to discuss the long-term consequences of this 
legacy, in the context of its international dimension as a decisive 
source for defining identity and culture. Therefore my focus will be 
on the interaction between the international system and the 
domestic political system. The first part of the paper is devoted to an 
assessment of the main features of the Cold War’s impact on Italy 
from the end of the Second World War to the 1960s. The second part 
of the paper discusses the legacies of the Cold War in Italy by 
focusing on two case studies: II.1 The experience of “national 
solidarity” and its international constraints (1976-1979). II.2 The 
Italian Left and the Second Cold War (1979-1985).  
 
 
I. The fabric of the Cold War 1945-1968 
 
In the first year after the Second World War, the Christian Democrat 
party emerged as the major Italian party, announcing a central 
political role for the Catholics which had not been established after 
the First World War. Despite this, its international connections were 
quite uncertain and took time to be set. Only in early 1947 a 
significant rapprochement between the DC and the United States 
was outlined, to be established when the left forces were expelled 
from government in May 1947. In this respect, Italian Anti-
Communism had domestic roots that were then overlaid by the 
international context. As a result, Italian Anti-Communism 
presented two distinct faces. On one hand, moderate liberals 
prevailed in the political leadership. Even after the beginning of the 
Cold War and their triumphal victory in the 1948 elections - that 
made them the dominant force of government and the centre of the 
political system for four decades - the Christian Democrats drew a 
clear line not only against the Communists but also against any 
involvement in the political game of the forces of the extreme right 
(obviously small but not insignificant) [Giovagnoli 1996]. On the 
other hand, the most extreme crusading tones emerging in Western 
propaganda at the peak of the Cold War became widespread during 
the 1948 electoral campaign. The Catholic Church used its 
enormous influence in Italian society for recovering the idea of a 
radical choice between civilisation and barbarity, sometimes even 
resembling the same mood that had been distinctive of Fascist 
propaganda (“either Rome, or Moscow”). This apocalyptic appeal 
meant that what was menaced were not only liberalism or 
democracy, but also human life and its basic values. Accordingly, 
Communists had to be condemned as alien elements outcast from 
civil society and from the body of the nation - they could not be 
Italians, as their action were seen as a direct consequence of an 
international conspiracy led by Moscow.  
The leader of the DC, Alcide De Gasperi, was able to distance his 
leadership from the direct influence of the Church [Craveri 2006]. 
While shepherding Italy’s membership into NATO, he avoided fuelling 
ideological confrontation and police measures against the 
Communists. He maintained a balance between the Americans and 
the Vatican – the two main sources of Anti-Communism, but also 
two reluctant partners, because of Catholic hostility towards 
American Protestant civilization – by providing his own strategy 
[Formigoni 1996]. By doing so, he also limited the radical attitude 
against Communism widespread in the popular opinion that 
supported government parties. Thus, in the Anti-Communist bloc, 
the leadership forged an image of the Communists as a political 
enemy. Such image, however, incorporated much more radical 
cultural images and civil war language, contributing to the formation 
of bloc identity.  
Despite significant differences, a similar setting can be seen on the 
Communist side. The PCI emerged from the war as one of the main 
European Communist parties after having been a very small party in 
the early 1920s and a clandestine organization from 1926 onwards. 
The strength of Italian Communists relied on the prestige of the 
Soviet Union as well as on the role they played in Anti-Fascist 
Resistance. Their international connection was quite solid, initially 
representing a comparative factor of strength against the Christian 
Democrats. Their credibility as a national political force was outlined 
by participation in coalition governments as a consequence of 
Palmiro Togliatti’s moderate “svolta di Salerno,” in accordance with 
Stalin’s interests. They contributed to the writing of the republican 
Constitution. The basic contradiction between their national policy 
and the organic link with the Soviet Union did not prevent them from 
establishing their hegemonic role in the social and political 
opposition front [Gozzini, Martinelli 1998]. However, Togliatti’s 
moderate Anti-Fascism was constantly challenged by more radical 
tendencies. The widespread revolutionary feelings that had been 
limited at the end of the war re-emerged in the struggle against the 
Marshall Plan. Anti-American mobilization became central to 
Communist policy. The Communists’ identification of threat was a 
mirror image of the Anti-Communist theory of conspiracy that made 
no distinction between national and international factors. American 
imperialism was perceived as presenting the same features of pre-
war power politics, including the Fascist one. The basic ideas of the 
Communists about the Western world replicated Soviet dogma on 
distrust of liberal democracy and on the inevitability of economic 
collapse, mass poverty, and war.  
Togliatti maintained his leadership by rejecting the “Greek 
perspective” against hardliners and pressure from below even after 
the founding of the Cominform (September 1947) [Pons 1999]. The 
huge mass character and the appeal to the Constitution became 
distinctive features of the so-called “partito nuovo,” as compared to 
other European Communist parties. This helped to limit anti-
systemic and antagonistic tendencies largely prevailing among the 
rank-and-file and also among cadres. The Communist leitmotiv 
accusation against the DC of betraying the Constitution reciprocated 
a political image of the enemy. Nevertheless, such discourse 
overlapped with civil war cultural images and language that 
permanently endangered moderation while providing a fundamental 
identity base.  
To be sure, the two blocs worked as basic components of the 
national society, capable of avoiding the outbreak of civil war. Recent 
historiography has put stress on this point, which is obviously 
decisive for our evaluation of the historical role played by the DC and 
the PCI in the origins of the Republic. West of the Balkans, Italy was 
the only country where the Second World War had been also a civil 
war. When the war was over, Italy experienced a precarious truce - 
being the only European country included in the Western bloc (with 
the exception of Greece) to risk precipitating into civil war when the 
Cold War began, in 1947-48. The role of the moderates on both 
sides, namely that of De Gasperi and Togliatti, was essential for 
avoiding a national catastrophe. Furthermore, their action paved the 
way for peaceful coexistence in the long run. The political 
moderation exercised on both sides provided the ground and the 
pedagogy for building republican citizenship [Ventrone 2007].  
After 1948, the Christian Democrats were able to put into effect a 
moderate version of containment - rejecting the most 
uncompromising measures against the Communist party suggested 
at various moments by the Americans [Del Pero 2001]. In De 
Gasperi’s thinking, the role played by the DC for limiting 
Communists was crucial to establish its political centrality, even 
from the point of view of the United States – while their eradication 
as a political subject would unpredictably change the same structure 
of the system by altering its constitutional foundations. The DC tried 
to de-politicize the memory of Resistance and practised continuity 
with the old order in State building, but maintained its commitment 
to the basic features of the Republic. As has been noted, there was a 
clash between “the radicalism of American plans for Italy, and the 
conservatism of the DC political project” – the former assuming that 
Italy needed a drastic modernization, both in terms of social reforms 
and of liberalization of the public sector, for becoming full member of 
the Atlantic Community, the latter believing that any dramatic 
fracture would jeopardize Italian stabilization [Del Pero 2003]. As for 
the Communists, the landslide defeat of the Popular Front in 1948 
elections de-legitimized them as a force of government. But it 
strengthened their bloc cohesion. They monopolized the memory and 
virtue of Anti-Fascism. They forged a kind of “negative integration” 
into the national community of large popular strata, controlling their 
anti-systemic feelings, and providing them with a sense of the State 
and of citizenship. The diffusion of a mythological face of Soviet 
reality and politics, surrounded by feelings of social emancipation, 
provided a metaphor for averting revolutionary catastrophe. 
Although the “national road” of the PCI did not mean any substantial 
distancing from loyalty to the Soviet Union, the room for manoeuvre 
of the Italian Communists in the domestic context was large enough 
to allow Togliatti to reject Stalin’s proposal that he become the 
Cominform’s secretary – thus defending the legal and parliamentary 
way of his party [Pons 2001].  
Nevertheless, the Christian Democrats’ “containment of 
containment” and the Communists’ “self-containment” could be 
exercised only at the price of maintaining the cohesion of the two 
opposing blocs. Both combinations deeply assimilated the esprit of 
the Cold War. Paranoid traits underlying the myth of an imminent 
“red scare” as well as of incumbent “fascism” continued to influence 
Italian life even after the stabilisation of the political system under 
centrist hegemony, the entry of Italy into NATO, and the division of 
Europe. Even moderate leaders could establish their leadership only 
by speaking the language of civil war – though constantly acting 
against such outcome. Both sides received funding from Washington 
and Moscow, and organised semi-military secret organisations with 
the aim of preparing adequate reaction to the other side’s eventual 
use of force [Aga Rossi, Zaslavsky 2007; Bernardi 2007]. More 
important, both sides represented themselves culturally and socially 
as separate worlds. Although largely sharing Catholic values 
especially about family and education, and in spite of their 
endorsement of the Constitution, the Communist self-representation 
was not just that of a political opposition, as that of an “imagined 
community” (a “state inside the state”) with its own rituals and 
symbols based on the Soviet myth [Guiso 2007; Andreucci 2006]. So 
they were perceived by large sectors of the conservative public 
opinion, especially in the South, and by sectors of the State like the 
police and the military. Divided memories were established about the 
symbolic significance of the liberation day, the 25th of April – a 
national celebration that came over time to be honoured by the 
opposition alone [Paggi 1999; Ventrone 2006]. Accordingly, the 
opposing stereotypes of Soviet Communism as a radical challenge - a 
threat to the Western values of market and democracy, as well as to 
civilisation as a whole - and as a bastion of Socialism - a social 
system inherently superior and peaceful, struggling for its own 
survival against the Western Cold War - had a long-lasting 
significance, even after Stalin's death.  
A subtle if significant duplicity, albeit scarcely a symmetry, should 
also be noted in perceptions and attitudes of the two manichaean 
Weltanschauung dominating and confronting each other in Italian 
society in the aftermath of the great divide of the Cold War. The 
Communist sub-culture was in its essence politically oriented, 
combining a rough Leninist pedagogy for the masses with an 
intellectual appeal. The eclectic approach to Communist militancy of 
the PCI might easily tolerate religious faith as well as absorb 
American cultural models that increasingly captured the imagination 
of many young people [Gundle 2000]. At the same time, intellectuals 
were often attracted by the rejection of Americanism and its mass 
culture, seen as a degeneration of the European cultural heritage. 
Anti-Communism presented instead a strong pre-political ingredient, 
combining the defence of Western liberties against Communist 
dictatorship with a primitive mass ideology based on the 
preservation of elementary components of society such as family, 
property, and religion. The Catholic sub-culture also had, however, a 
powerful hold on popular imagination and a strong media presence 
even if it lacked the intellectual prestige the Left enjoyed.  
The lack of a “social-democratic compromise” between state, capital, 
and labour in Italy provided the socio-economic background for the 
stance of both sides [Spagnolo 2001]. The moderate and conservative 
belief was that Communism represented a consequence of the 
country’s backwardness and would automatically disappear under 
the impact of economic reconstruction and gradual modernisation, 
regardless of any development of welfare. In fact, a kind of “passive 
revolution” was carried out through capitalist modernization – one 
that made it easier to contain the influence of the Left. However, the 
anti-welfare approach of the Italian “economic miracle” helped the 
Communists to denounce the lack of reform thinking in the ruling 
classes of the country, to marginalize Social Democratic orientations, 
and to assert themselves as advocates of modernization [Gualtieri 
2001]. Their unsophisticated picture of Italian capitalism as 
inherently backward, in spite of its dynamism, and the inability to 
perceive the national society’s growing interdependence with the 
Western system became virtues instead of vices. Communist support 
in the weakest sectors of society was facilitated even in the 
conditions of modernization by fear that social rights and income 
improvement might be reversed – as people maintained memory of 
what had happened under the Fascist regime. Togliatti’s “partito 
nuovo” was a catch-all party more than a class-based one, capable of 
maintaining its Communist profile while adapting itself to capitalist 
prosperity (and even governing such prosperity in crucial regions of 
the country). Bipolarity became a fundamental feature of Italian 
society and political culture - even before the definitive bipolarization 
of the political system actually emerging at the end of the 1960s.  
This may result in an over-simplified picture. Especially the anti-
Communist world was highly complex and fragmented, even more 
than the world of the Italian Left was. Italian Anti-Communism 
obviously underwent an evolution, which can be summarised as a 
process of “secularisation.” The gradual weakening of the influence 
of the Catholic Church in Italian society that took place as a 
consequence of the “economic miracle” in the 1960s also meant 
change in the ideological components of Italian Anti-Communism. 
However, it basically maintained its original dual structure. On one 
hand, moderation prevailed in the Christian Democrat party, whose 
majority rejected the option to let fall the Anti-Fascist barrier by 
associating the radical right to power and decided to let the 
Socialists join the government in the early 1960s - thus enlarging the 
sphere of political legitimacy to rule the country. On the other hand, 
antagonism against the left was harsh and widespread in the so-
called “silent majority” of public opinion as well as in state 
apparatuses. The very launching of the centre-left governments was 
the outcome of an acute conflict in the ruling classes, in which 
democratic Anti-Communism prevailed preventing the menace of a 
military coup d’état [Craveri 1995]. The “secularisation” of Italian 
Communism was not a straightforward process, either. Despite the 
shock brought about by Khrushchev’s denounciation of Stalin’s 
crimes and by the subsequent Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, 
belief in the Soviet myth did not decline rapidly. The very myth of the 
Soviet Union that helped the Communists to ensure their cohesion, 
to found their own mass culture, and to exercise hegemony over the 
Left, had prevented them also from expanding their influence in 
Italian society. But the domestic isolation that followed the year 
1956, after the break with the Socialists, had the effect of reinforcing 
the Communist bloc’s social and political cohesion, including its link 
with the Soviet Union and with the International Communist 
movement [Pons 2004; Spagnolo 2006]. The combination between 
flexible political opposition to the new centre-left alliance and bloc 
cohesion allowed the PCI to resist quite well the attempt of the 
centre-left governments to marginalize Communist implantation and 
political culture.  
I do not pretend to analyse such complexity. My purpose here is just 
to stress the following points, which may be seen as aspects of an 
Italian peculiarity in post-war international European history:  
a) The socio-cultural cleavages of Italian society were obviously 
transformed by the modernisation of the 1960s, but the basic 
split occurring with the Cold War divide revealed remarkable 
persistence shaping its “special democracy” - from the mid-1960s 
(when German Social Democrats entered the Grand Coalition) the 
only democracy in Europe to be based on one party of permanent 
government and one party permanent opposition.  
b) The birth of new political movements as a consequence of 1968 
created all over Europe, and in Italy too, a broader context for 
challenging the Cold War system, whose loyalties were openly 
contested and dismissed. The revival of Anti-Fascism occupied a 
significant place in the Italian political discourse and looked like a 
national discourse to some extent detached from Cold War topics.  
c) Italy was not the only European country where loyalties towards 
Soviet Communism were maintained in relevant sectors of the 
national society for two decades and more after the beginning of 
the Cold War – France experienced the same situation. After 
1968, however, Italian Communism underwent significant 
evolution, distancing itself from Soviet Communism, embracing 
European integration as a political perspective, and achieving 
political consensus never reached by any Western Communist 
party.  
d) The launching of European détente (Ostpolitik), as distinct from 
bipolar détente, and the development of European integration in 
the early 1970s created a new environment that mitigated bipolar 
loyalties and a network that might help in managing political 
transition, as was the case for Portugal. In this respect, Europe 
and Europeanism became particularly important to Italian 
political forces, either reluctant to adopt a strong Atlanticist 
position (the Democratic Christians and the Socialists) or willing 
to accept the country’s Western alliance without embracing 
Atlanticism (the Communists).  
e) The bipolar structure of the Italian political system definitively 
emerged in the 1968 elections and reached its peak by the mid-
1970s - reflecting bipolarism in the international system in a way 
that did not exist in any other European country. Despite 
changes in the Cold War order, Italy’s “special democracy” would 
be maintained because of the combination between Anti-
Communist reaction (national and international) and the limited 
capacity to achieve a real breakthrough by the political subjects 
aiming at change, to begin with the Communists.  
 
 
II. The legacies of the Cold War 1968-1989 
 
II.1 The experience of “national solidarity” and its international 
constraints (1976-1979) 
 
By the mid-1970s the PCI, as the major opposition party, gathered 
increasing support that revealed social pressure from below for 
change and for overcoming Italian “special democracy” – a 
spontaneous movement de facto aimed at making Italian democracy 
“normal” in the context of European integration and of the 
democratization of Southern Europe (after the fall of dictatorships in 
Portugal, Greece, and Spain). Against the context of an economic 
crisis threatening to de-legitimize the ruling classes, a split 
increasingly took place inside the Anti-Communist front. From 1974 
onwards, relevant components of the Christian Democrat party, 
under the leadership of Aldo Moro, saw the need of associating 
Communist opposition to national responsibilities – thus replicating 
ten years later towards the Communists the “opening to the left” 
undertaken in the 1960s towards the Socialists, in order to maintain 
DC’s centrality. Moro’s “strategy of attention” was about institutional 
collaboration with the PCI and the trade unions, one that would put 
into question the old distinction between constitutional and political 
legitimacies, however without openly repudiating it. Such perspective 
was a reply to the challenge put forward by the PCI leader, Enrico 
Berlinguer, through the proposal of a “historic compromise,” calling 
for the immediate fall of the Anti-Communist barrier and the recover 
of Anti-Fascism as the authentic base for Italian democracy. More 
than about demolishing the two traditional blocs implanted in Italian 
society, both Moro and Berlinguer thought about liquidating the 
mutual images of political enemies created by the Cold War - sharing 
the idea that international détente would put an end to Cold War 
constraints over the country’s sovereignty [Gualtieri 2004].  
On the international level, however, neither Washington, nor Moscow 
conceived détente as a process for political change in Europe. To the 
contrary, for both powers détente was a conservative response to the 
social and political unrest of 1968 and a way of strengthening the 
bipolar order. In this respect, any solution to the Italian crisis that 
would bring Communists into the government was fiercely 
contrasted by both superpowers. Kissinger feared a domino effect 
provoked by the combined influence of the Portuguese revolution 
and of Italian Communists in Southern Europe – regardless of how 
authentic their autonomy from Moscow was. He firmly maintained 
that any association of the Communists to government would be 
harmful to NATO. The Soviets suspected that Eurocommunism 
might become a dangerous heresy and that PCI participation in the 
government could open scenarios for change in East Central Europe. 
Marginal as it was for influencing the Italian context, the Soviet 
search for legitimacy and stability in its own sphere of influence 
nonetheless interacted with Anti-Communism in the West. It may be 
said that, by the mid-1970s, as Anti-Communism was losing its 
grasp in Italian domestic policy, it was enforced from abroad by the 
United States in the context of bipolar conservatism - finding a hold 
in sectors of the political system (the so-called “American party” 
composed by right wing components of the DC and by minor 
moderate non-Catholic forces) as well as in the public opinion 
[Giovagnoli, Pons 2003].  
The role played in the 1970s by the legacy of the split between Anti-
Communism and Anti-Fascism in Italian society has yet to be 
analysed by historians. Anti-Fascism was re-launched as a label of 
the “new left,” as well as of the traditional forces of the left, but Anti-
Communism had its relevance as a reaction against the pressure for 
political and social change generated by 1968. This opposition 
contributed to creating the acute climate of violence that 
characterised the Italian crisis of the 1970s. The perception of the 
Anti-Communist legacy now provided ground for constant suspicion 
and even obsession for a reactionary coup on the Communist side. 
Not all of this was paranoia. The extreme right was responsible for a 
whole series of bloody terrorist attacks, to begin with the bombs in 
Milan of December 1969. Their actions found protection by shadowy 
segments of state apparatuses. The sources and authors of the so-
called “strategy of tension” still have to be clearly ascertained. 
However, the Communists were inclined to see any Neo-Fascist 
resurgence as revealing plots organised by fully “degenerate” organs 
of the state, directly supported by foreign intelligence, to combat 
their ascendancy in the political arena. This was nothing other than 
a legacy of the cultural Cold War. The DC was now seen more as a 
corrupt mafia than as a Cold Warrior, but it could hardly be a 
legitimate power or a partner anyway. On the opposite side, Anti-
Communist opinion, more or less moderate, was inclined to perceive 
the students’ movement, violent street fighting, and even red 
terrorism as an undifferentiated by-product of Marxism. Accordingly, 
the roots of political violence should be found in Communist 
influence over Italian society. The Anti-Communist view was not 
entirely paranoid, either. The mythology of a “new resistance” and 
the relaunching of a revolutionary calling based on Marxist revival 
were undoubtedly a feature of former Communist militants as well 
as of 1968 gauchistes. But such a reality was seen through the lens 
of Cold War legacies, thus rejecting any chance for democratic 
legitimacy to the PCI despite its firmness in fighting against political 
violence and defending the institutions of the Republic – harshly 
contested, in fact, by the forces of extra-parliamentary “new left” 
[Taviani 2003]. On both sides, the image of the enemy and the 
language of civil conflict persisted regardless of the changing 
attitudes of major political forces.  
In the political game, as ever, moderation prevailed over socio-
cultural divisions. The national strategies of DC and of PCI were 
carried on in the aftermath of the 1976 elections, when bipolarity 
reached its peak (the two parties collected almost three quarters of 
the voters). The new government led by Giulio Andreotti was formed 
thanks to Communist neutrality in the Parliament. Thus the 
“national solidarity” experience was launched by maintaining a 
distinction between the two principles of legitimacy in the republican 
space – the Communist “non-vote” on the Andreotti government 
reflected association to institutional responsibility more than 
opening any clear political prospect. For more than one year, the 
Democratic Christians would essentially defend that solution as the 
boundary to feasible collaboration, though without excluding an 
evolution, while the Communists pressed for a part in the majority 
and in government. The byzantine formula of “national solidarity” 
achieved no real understanding in Washington or in the Western 
European governments. All rejected the possibility of any Communist 
involvement in ruling Italy - despite the belief in European 
integration held by the PCI and Berlinguer’s public statement that 
PCI autonomy was better guaranteed under the Atlantic Alliance 
than it would be under the Warsaw Pact. In other words, the 
national strategies of the main political forces were largely 
disconnected from interaction with the international actors [Gualtieri 
2006; Pons 2006].  
The advocates for change saw the search for a new national 
arrangement as a priority. Both Moro and Berlinguer, from different 
perspectives, believed that such an accomplishment could represent 
a fait accompli producing over time more lack of concern than 
hostility in international opinion. The principle of “neither 
interference nor indifference” adopted by the new Carter 
administration (January 1977) seemed to open some chance for 
tolerance in Washington. Consequently, international issues were 
removed from the “common program” signed by the major political 
forces in June 1977, as a basis for government action. Only between 
October and December 1977 did the protagonists of “national 
solidarity,” including the Communists, approve a common document 
on the principles of Italian foreign policy, stressing their tribute to 
the Atlantic Alliance and to European integration. This was the only 
real effort to stabilize “national unity” in the Italian political system 
of the 1970s [De Felice 1996]. Moro probably believed that a such 
step might strengthen his design of gradual involvement of the 
Communists in a subordinate position. Berlinguer saw it as a 
prelude to entry into the political majority. Both considered foreign 
policy as nothing more than a tool of internal policy. Both had their 
own reasons.  
From the point of view of Moro, the removal from the political scene 
of Kissinger, his bete noire, opened the door for better understanding 
with the United States. Actually he established a close dialogue with 
the new US Ambassador in Rome, Richard Gardner. The relative 
tolerance of the Carter administration could be seen as providing 
more ground for a double policy of the Christian Democrats, whose 
goal was at the same time playing on the institutional responsibility 
of the Communists and eroding their political consensus – as such a 
responsibility entailed unpopular measures to face the economic 
crisis while remaining at the margins of political power and being 
unable to claim at least the trade off between “austerity” and 
government. Although such a cynical approach might reflect more 
Andreotti’s outlook than Moro’s, all the Christian Democrats were 
willing to defend their central place in the political system, in crisis 
as it was [Craveri 1995; Giovagnoli 1996]. From the point of view of 
Berlinguer, Eurocommunism as a means for achieving international 
legitimacy was at its height and provided credibility in term of PCI 
autonomy from Moscow. The Soviets’ increasingly bitter reaction 
against Eurocommunism as a form of “revisionism” indirectly 
confirmed that the Italian Communists had taken the right position. 
Initially, furthermore, the conduct of the Carter administration 
looked encouraging, at least different from Kissinger’s, and the 
Italian Communists for the first time established some relationship 
with the American ambassador [Pons 2006]. Lacking a strong foreign 
partner, they enforced their reliability as Anti-Fascists, exploiting the 
divisions of the Anti-Communist camp, and exercising pressure for 
the logical outcome of “national solidarity,” a real political coalition 
to rule the country in time of emergency.  
The elusive national strategies of Moro and Berlinguer were opposed 
by substantial continuity in the conduct of the great powers, 
probably enforced by the first signs of the crisis of détente. The 
Soviet Union formally provided (unrequested) support for the Italian 
Communists, but behind the scene attacked them by assuming that 
Eurocommunism as well as “national solidarity” just meant yielding 
to Western blackmail and losing contact with popular masses. The 
paradox was that any move of Moscow would damage the PCI: too 
close a relationship would harm the credibility of Eurocommunism, 
but further distancing might turn into a split undermining the 
strength of the party. The United States reaffirmed their stand 
against any participation of the Communists in the government in a 
famous declaration issued on 12 January 1978. The declaration was 
disappointing for those who had hoped for more flexibility, but 
Washington had never really encouraged such expectations. 
Undoubtedly, Carter’s policy had been wavering and incoherent, 
eventually unable to provide a detachment from Kissinger’s views 
[Wall 2006]. Naively expecting to find a Social Democratic PCI when 
he arrived in Italy, ambassador Gardner could not fully appreciate 
PCI independence from Moscow. However, neither the DC nor the 
PCI promoted much effort of persuasion about “national solidarity.” 
At the end of 1977, Moro even played on American ambiguities, 
asking Gardner for Washington’s political intervention only in the 
case of new elections, as a consequence of the failure of negotiations 
to involve the Communists in the parliamentary majority. Fearful of 
a successful outcome of negotiations, and listening to advice from 
Anti-Communist political opinion, Gardner decided instead to 
pressure Washington for the declaration of January 1978 [Gardner 
2004].  
The reaction of the great powers to the evolution of “national 
solidarity” was therefore as rigid as predictable. Was it also crucial 
for deciding the destiny of Italy, as many deterministic narratives of 
the 1970s assume? That is highly doubtful. What was crucial was 
the combination between national and international Anti-
Communism, on one hand, and the fragility of change strategies, on 
the other. The American position only contributed to exacerbating 
the Italian crisis, providing no positive solution by its indirect 
support to tendencies merely determined to erode Communist 
consensus. But the crisis of “national solidarity” was on its way. The 
political situation was one of stalemate, as relations between the 
major political forces and their strategies had yet to be clarified. 
Popular opinion supporting the protagonists of “national solidarity” 
was still divided between those upset with the opening to 
Communists and those frustrated because of insufficient opening. 
Measures undertaken against the economic crisis did not make the 
government more popular. Political violence in the country reached 
its peak and increasingly extremist forces on the left addressed 
themselves against “national solidarity.” In no other European 
country could violence and even terrorism count on such a relatively 
extended area of indifference and neutrality, let alone underlying 
episodic consensus, as was the case for Italy. The kidnapping of 
Moro by the Red Brigades in March 1978 was not the beginning of 
the political crisis, as is often wrongly assumed – it marked its 
culmination [Giovagnoli 2006]. To be sure, his moderate profile was 
an obvious target for terrorists with a worse-is-better philosophy. His 
hidden enemies would not help to save his life, and his allies would 
have their hands tied by the principle of avoiding any legitimization 
of terrorism. The death of the most important interlocutor of the 
Communists severely weakened the search for any further 
agreement in the context of “national solidarity.” The Communists 
went back to opposition few months later, in January 1979.  
There was nothing inevitable in the failure of “national solidarity.” 
However, its political basis had been weak from the very beginning. 
The experiment had strong adversaries, but its protagonists cannot 
be exempt from criticism. Moro was an ambiguous leader. Much 
more than other Christian Democrats, he showed openness towards 
the Communists, but his strategy also entailed the erosion of their 
political consensus, indirectly conceding room of manoeuvre for his 
conservative party colleagues, like Andreotti [Gualtieri 2006]. He 
might have thought about the gradual development of alternative 
groupings fully legitimized to ending Italian “special democracy,” but 
he also defended the contradictory principle of DC “centrality” in the 
political system – a legacy of the Cold War and a code identifying the 
political projection of Anti-Communist tradition. Although cautious 
in his international conduct, he misread the significance of détente 
and put stress on a merely national strategy. His effort for removing 
the image of the political enemy was sincere, but his strategy was 
hardly coherent. It can hardly be seen how it might open the way for 
overcoming the distinction between Anti-Fascist inclusion of the 
Communists in constitutional legitimacy and Anti-Communist 
exclusion of the Communists from political legitimacy.  
Berlinguer was no more consistent. His “historic compromise” was 
much more a proposal for coalition building between the two former 
enemy blocs than a real perspective for liquidating “special 
democracy.” He had a pessimistic view of the country as more 
similar to Chile – therefore exposed to the threat of a reactionary 
coup like that carried out by general Pinochet in September 1973 
with Kissinger’s connivance – than to other European countries. His 
assertion of Anti-Fascist legitimacy against Anti-Communist 
tradition was intended to end the Cold War, but the monopoly of 
Anti-Fascism reflected as well Cold War legacies – as a code for 
identifying the political identity of national Communism and of the 
Italian left. Berlinguer struggled at the same time for the legitimacy 
of the Italian Communists to rule a Western European country and 
for their role as reformers of Soviet Communism – two goals that 
proved to be scarcely compatible [Pons 2006]. He deceived himself 
about détente as a factor for change in single European countries. 
While Eurocommunism might evoke sympathy in Western public 
opinion, it could achieve no allies in Europe [Pons forthcoming 2009-
10]. He understood that change itself was crucial for turning political 
adversaries to change as well, but he kept limits as he felt that the 
bloc of the Left might come under most radical transformations.  
As they represented the weak side of the story and the force more 
deeply engaged in self-reform, the Italian Communists may merit 
some additional remarks. Whatever the conditioning of adverse 
factors on their choices, Italian Communists could not figure out 
dilemmas originating from their own identity and mind. Though the 
emergence of a Eurocommunist critique of the Soviet Union had 
obtained resonance abroad and challenged the Cold War order, its 
impact was limited by the determination not to break with Moscow. 
The assumption was that an eventual break would weaken the 
influence of PCI both internationally, loosing its self-proclaimed role 
of a bridge towards Eastern Europe, and nationally, dissipating the 
legacy of “partito nuovo.” The PCI’s choice to prevent a break with 
Moscow depended heavily on identity politics hardly coherent with 
the reality of larger European policy: first, the idea that a radical 
challenge to Moscow, even more than advocating pluralism and 
democracy as universal values, would have the consequence of an 
undesired “normalisation” and “social-democratisation” of PCI; 
second, that maintaining a special relationship with the Soviet world 
made sense because “real Socialism” could be successfully reformed, 
possibly revealing unexpected potential; third, that Soviet 
Communism, albeit backward and inapplicable in the West, 
maintained a role for counter-balancing American power and 
Americanisation [Pons 2006].  
By the end of the 1970s, Communism in Italy had undergone 
substantial changes. Despite its reluctance to dissolve the formal 
relationship with Moscow, the PCI had become functionally 
autonomous. Although its search for a “third way” was devoid of any 
concrete political prospect, the PCI’s political culture had become, to 
a significant extent, neither Soviet nor Social Democratic. But the 
failure of “national solidarity” determined nonetheless the 
persistence of a basic opposition between Communism and Anti-
Communism in the political system and in the political discourse. 
The split in the Anti-Communist front was repaired – though 
changes inside that front would occur because of a new Socialist 
approach. While the country slowly came out of its crisis – to a large 
degree because of the very stand of “national solidarity” as red 
terrorism had committed suicide by killing Moro and political 
violence gradually vanished – the centre-left alliance was relaunched. 
Communists were again excluded from power and would never come 
back into government. The outbreak of the so-called Second Cold 
War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) would 
contribute to restoring the opposition between two blocs in the 
political system – despite the fact that Atlanticist loyalties had 
obviously changed and that Soviet loyalties had almost disappeared. 
Such opposition could hardly be said to follow the division between 
conservatives and Social Democrats that was typical of the main 
European countries (including those of recent democracy like Spain). 
It was an Italian peculiarity.  
 
II.2 The Italian Left and the Second Cold War (1979-1985) 
 
The relaunching of Anti-Communism during the Second Cold War, 
especially after the establishment of the Reagan administration in 
the United States (January 1981), found fertile ground in Italy. 
Bipolarity in the domestic context no longer reflected international 
alliances, but it worked nonetheless. On one side, the neo Anti-
Totalitarian thrust of Reagan was used by Italian Anti-Communists 
as a means of political struggle against the residual influence of the 
PCI (despite its deep crisis after the end of “national solidarity,” the 
party still collected almost one third of the electorate). On the other 
side, the critical positions accumulated by the PCI were not 
eliminated by the crisis of détente, and culminated in the “rift” with 
Moscow, in the aftermath of the coup d'état in Poland (December 
1981). Berlinguer harshly condemned the coup in a famous 
television interview. Soon thereafter, for the first time, an open 
excommunication was pronounced by Moscow against the PCI in a 
“Pravda” editorial. Relations between the two former partners were 
frozen, while attempts to split the PCI were carried on by the Soviets 
behind the scenes. Nevertheless, there was no further evolution in 
the Italian Communists’ criticism of the Soviet Union. They 
established warm enough relations with European Social-Democrats, 
but did not establish any alliance with them. Their distancing from 
Moscow represented an aspect of the re-affirmation of “diversity” 
from all other national political forces, seen as compromised by 
participation in a long-standing corrupted “regime” under the shield 
of the Western Cold War. Consequently, the “rift” had no real impact 
in the domestic political arena [Pons 2006].  
To the contrary, a harsh competition arose between the Communists 
and the Socialists. The Socialist leader Bettino Craxi challenged the 
PCI after the successful pattern employed by Mitterand against the 
PCF. There was, however, a significant difference. While the 
competition in France, harsh as it was, did not prevent the formation 
of an alliance that took Mitterand to power in 1981 (and the PCF in 
government though in an obvious subordinate position), this did not 
happen in Italy, despite the twilight of the DC’s centrality in the 
political system. Quite significantly, the principle of alternative 
leadership in the country’s government was established only inside 
the Anti-Communist front – when firstly the republican Giovanni 
Spadolini and then Craxi assumed the premiership. The rules of 
Italy’s “special democracy” did not fundamentally change. In fact, the 
Italian left would maintain its basic division as it had been forged by 
the development of national and international bipolarity in the post-
war era. Such opposition came to be personified in the irreconcilable 
figures of Berlinguer and Craxi. The international aspect of their 
opposition seems particularly revealing. In fact, the PCI and the PSI 
represented their disputes as replicating the same differences that 
took place in the European left, namely between the German Social 
Democrats and the French Socialists – thereby politically choosing a 
deployment internal to European politics and to the European left. 
But they ended by taking sides scarcely in line with their European 
interlocutors and replicating, to a considerable extent, the positions 
of Gorbachev and of Reagan – thereby culturally following a 
deployment that reflected Cold War legacies.  
The central European question in international affairs during the 
first half of the 1980s was undoubtedly that of the so-called Euro-
missiles – the Western reaction against the challenge launched by 
Moscow by installing new strategic missiles threatening Western 
Europe. From this standpoint, the respective alignment of the Italian 
Socialists with Mitterand’s pro-Atlanticist firmness, and of the Italian 
Communists with SPD “pacifism,” could easily be seen. Craxi sided 
with Mitterand’s positions in favour of the NATO installation of Euro-
missiles even before assuming government leadership (July 1983). 
Thus Craxi obtained full legitimacy for his candidacy to govern the 
country [Colarizi, Gervasoni 2005]. His administration immediately 
had to face the strongest wave of pacifist movements on a European 
scale in the second half of 1983. While holding firm in his pro-
Atlanticism with regard to East-West relations, he lent his leadership 
the stamp of autonomy from the United States on other issues of 
international policy, starting with the Middle East [Varsori 1998]. 
Berlinguer’s path appears to be the opposing one. After the end of 
the “national unity” experience, he largely ignored the problem of 
legitimization that he had faced in the mid-1970s. The battle against 
Euro-missiles was placed at the centre of the PCI’s international 
policy. This position found partners not only thanks to the rise of 
significant pacifist movements, but also after the SPD’s shift to 
critical positions against NATO installation of Euromissiles and in 
favour of further negotiations. These positions were to represent a 
political reference for the PCI.  
However, if we turn our attention to how the respective political 
positions were justified and how, in particular, the conduct of the 
Soviet Union had to be interpreted in the light of the Second Cold 
War, then we are led to see that the differences between the two 
forces of the Italian Left were even more pronounced, taking on the 
appearance of a dichotomy. The Italian Socialists carried on the 
Mitterand option, which had obviously more general strategic 
implications in the competition with the Communists, as a pattern 
for establishing Socialist hegemony over the Left. In this respect, 
they tried to establish a new paradigm for Anti-Communism, one 
rejecting Catholic conservatism and instead challenging the 
Communists on the agenda for reforms and modernization. Openly 
focusing on the question of how the reformist Socialist culture could 
foster PCI’s evolution, they pressed on the terrain of the “Soviet 
question” at the very moment when this card appeared the most 
playable. Among the coordinates followed by Craxi’s leadership 
group and by the intellectual forces supporting it, two appear to be 
of particular relevance: the grounds for dissent from the German 
Social Democratic positions, and the attention to the issue of the 
crisis of “real Socialism.” The two points were closely linked. The 
Italian Socialists criticized the SPD’s anchor to Ostpolitik both 
because it was doubted that this process had favoured change in the 
East, and because it was believed to have eventually encouraged the 
USSR’s power politics instead of strengthening European peace. This 
was not necessarily the radical Reaganist criticism of détente as 
appeasement. Like the French Socialists, the Italians rather thought 
that détente had exhausted its thrust and that the USSR’s 
worrisome drift required different responses. No less than Mitterand, 
Craxi believed that this did not exclude dialogue, but one conducted 
from a position of firmness. In particular, the insistence on the 
theme of security in Europe – but also on “flexibility combined with 
firmness” – was a central point in Craxi’s political stand on the eve of 
the first deployment of American missiles on European territory, 
scheduled for December 1983 [Colarizi et al. 2004].  
However, the Italian Socialists put distinctive emphasis on seeing the 
USSR as a totalitarian regime and an expansionist power of an 
imperial nature. This special emphasis was ambivalent. On one 
hand, it was fed by remarkable sensitivity to the figures and forces of 
opposition in Eastern Europe, obviously with particular attention to 
Poland. This helped to present the future of Soviet Communism 
quite problematic to the Italian Left, scarcely prepared for such 
scenario. Much more than the Italian Communists, the Socialists 
were aware that the USSR and “real Socialism” were in a crisis open 
to unpredictable outcomes. On the other hand, the insistence on the 
anti-totalitarian motif had strong polemical implications against the 
Communists, which became an end in itself and reduced to the 
contingencies of domestic policy the attention to the issue of freedom 
for the East. This gave rise to a tendency of the Italian Socialists to 
slip from Mitterand’s realism to Reagan’s anti-Communist ideological 
imperative without finding a sufficiently consistent balance point. 
Their proximity to Reagan’s paradigm on Communism, as compared 
with the German and with the French Socialists as well, was to 
deepen the cultural clashes hinging on the traditional 
Communism/Anti-Communism polarity within national society. 
Consequently, the attempt to provide a “modern” version of Anti-
Communism proved to be scarcely effective. Instead of pressuring 
Communists, Craxi struggled to prevail over Christian Democrats 
and take the lead in the Anti-Communist front. The obstinate 
disavowal of the evolution of Italian Communism, the insistence on 
continuing to represent it as an appendix to the Soviet world, and 
the refusal to accept its growing legitimacy as a force of the 
European Left, offered a contingent position of strength in the 
political game, but ended up depriving Craxi of a sense of direction 
at the historic moment of the end of Communism, in 1989. The 
instrumental interaction between international policy and domestic 
politics impoverished the initial intuitions regarding the crisis of 
Communism, and was a root cause of the degeneration and loss of 
hegemonic impetus of Craxi’s PSI in the second half of the decade 
[Cafagna 1996; Colarizi, Gervasoni 2005].  
The Italian Communists’ increasing self-representation as part of the 
European Left suffered from a contradiction. The political axis 
established with the SPD in the first half of the decade with regard to 
defending détente actually concealed a substantial divergence. 
Unlike the German Social Democrats, the Italian Communists did 
not acknowledge the threat that the USSR actually posed to the 
security of Western Europe, and their criticism of Soviet “power 
politics” maintained a distinction in quality from the image attached 
to American “imperialism.” Berlinguer kept a vision substantially 
different from that of the European Socialists. He hoped for reform of 
“real socialism” not simply for the safety of European peace, but also 
for the ideal purposes of Socialism – as though even if the “Soviet 
model” was no longer suitable, its reform would lend a certain anti-
capitalist and anti-consumerist dignity. The perplexities that 
emerged even among Communist intellectuals as to the prospect of 
reforming Soviet Communism did not shift his orientation. It was a 
foundation of identity politics that prevailed in the late Berlinguer - 
the invention of a tradition based on the notion of the “third way” 
between the Social Democratic model and the Soviet one [Gualtieri 
2006; Pons 2006]. Such a way of thinking appeared sufficiently 
rooted as to not be destined to dissolve with the death of Berlinguer. 
It was even corroborated by Gorbachev. The Italian Communists saw 
his Perestroika as generated in part by their political influence, and 
felt themselves committed to Perestroika as the USSR’s reform 
process they had waited for a long time. They entertained the illusion 
that Gorbachev would launch a reform of Communism. The paradox 
of Gorbachev’s impact on Italian Communists is that it ended up 
hindering, and not stimulating, awareness of the crisis of 
Communism. It prevented them from full acceptance of the Social 
Democratic orientation, in spite of their growing links with the 
European left. The internal factor of alienation from the political 
game and head-on collision with the Socialists was equally 
meaningful for maintaining the legacy of Berlinguer after his death. 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall caught the Italian Communists adrift, 
making them improvise a change aimed at safeguarding their own 
profile as a force of Italian democracy, but with fragile cultural bases 
[Possieri 2007; Pons, forthcoming 2008].  
Politically divided along the same lines of differentiation as between 
the French and the German Socialists, the two forces of the Italian 
Left diverged even more deeply from the standpoint of their 
respective political cultures. The crisis of Communism thus had in 
Italy an impact and significance far greater than in other countries of 
Western Europe, with the paradoxical result of deepening the long 
lasting split placed at the heart of the Italian Left. The Italian 
Communists’ response, aimed above all at defending their own 
identity, no longer equated with Soviet Communism or with the 
Social Democracies either, pushed towards blind conflict. The Italian 
Socialists made a decisive contribution to shifting the conflict to 
terms of traditional Anti-Communism although they saw the twilight 
of Communist identity. The Cold War’s incorporation within the 
Italian Left was to be stronger than the will to relegate it to the past 
that had marked the Socialists’ and Communists’ political discourse. 
The end of the Cold War, instead of being a liberating event, heralded 
the demise of both duelling parties.  
Cold War legacies conditioned Italy’s national context more deeply 
than elsewhere. During the 1980s, the image of the Communist 
enemy was still alive in Italian Anti-Communism. The Socialists’ 
attempt to modify Anti-Communist tradition by challenging the PCI 
on the modernization of political culture was a rational one. But it 
resulted in a tenacious unwillingness to accept the reality of a 
Communist party that had gradually become a national democratic 
force - which explained the persistence of PCI's influence and its 
“abnormal” leading role in the Italian Left. Thus, Anti-Communism 
maintained its compactness as a basic structure of the Italian 
political system even when the Cold War was coming to its end. As 
for the Communists, their denounciation of the increasing 
corruption of the political system was certainly well founded. But 
their self-proclaimed “diversity” was a defensive response to their 
own crisis and a way for re-inventing bloc opposition in moral terms. 
This contributed to the persistence of the employment of Anti-
Fascism as an identity notion, as it had been under the influence of 
the Cold War.  
The Cold War and the role of Soviet Communism were perceived in 
Italy as much more crucial than in other European countries – 
regardless of the changing international environment of the two 
decades preceding 1989. Although Cold War culture had largely 
exhausted itself, the legacy of the old international loyalties and 
identities exerted its visible, if residual, influence. This was not 
simply the consequence of the presence of a Communist party in 
Italian society. It was the consequence of the endurance and 
ambiguities of the opposition between Communism and Anti-
Communism - as it was forged and preserved in Italian political 
culture, in spite of its obsolescence, both by the dynamics of the 
domestic context and by the constraints of the international system. 
All of this created the premises for the persistence of an Italian 
peculiarity. The two legacies interacted, contributing because of their 
extremes to the endurance of the frailty of civic culture in Italian 
society. Italy has been the only Western European country in which, 
after the end of the Cold War, the uncertain frontier of a “post-
Communist” transition in the leading force of the Left has been 
confronted by a fierce “post-anti-Communist” discourse of the forces 
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